There is an old saying in NBA lore: Always trade like for like.
It is difficult to trade centers for guards — eventually, you have to replace that center, right? It is hard to replace shooting unless you are bringing in more shooting.
Sure, trades are done with other thoughts in mind too. They may be done for cap considerations. This is how and why a lot of trades are done these days as teams try to position their cap for maximum flexibility. They may be done to clear the path for a younger player to take a role. Trades are not always about making the current team better.
But something is always lost in a trade as much as something is gained. Even when there is a clear motivation and a clear reason for a deal to go down. Especially with successful teams, something always gets lost in a trade.
Nowhere is this clearer throughout Orlando Magic history in trades involving the team’s best shooters. The Magic have had such a deep and rich history with shooters that seeing some of them depart left major scars and major holes in the franchise. Some of which it took a long time to recover from.
The Orlando Magic have a strong history with shooting and their ability to be ahead of the curve. But they have had some misses as they tried to find shooting. Even when it made some sense on paper.
More importantly, the Magic in many of these trades felt like they were trading a like for like. They felt like they were replacing their shooting with shooting. On paper, it seemed like the team was only taking a minor downgrade perhaps.
In reality, what these kinds of moves showed was that the shooter is more important than shooting. Especially for the roles the team was looking to fill.
That much should become increasingly clear. Every team can probably point to moves that seemed to make sense and on paper looked like a good idea, but something did not click. And suddenly they were regretting giving up the known quantity.
Suddenly two dimes are not worth a quarter.
There are forgotten shooters that did not click in a Magic uniform even if they seemed like they might. And there are players and shooters the Magic traded too soon who could have helped the team evolve and develop.
There are a lot of these stories in the Magic’s franchise journey. And as much as we should highlight the best shooters in the franchise’s history, it is also worth it to highlight how the team messed up and did not value what they had or failed to develop potentially strong shooters.
Every team has its list of trades and moves it regrets. When it comes to shooting and finding elite shooters, giving up on shooters too soon is just as big of a crime.
Orlando Magic Shooting Month: Shooting trades the Magic regret
Salary Dumps
We want to focus this post more on trades than free agent acquisitions. But it is impossible to look at shooting moves the Orlando Magic might regret without looking at a few of them. And the best place to start is with salary dumps.
These are not necessarily moves the team might regret fully because they were in different positions overall. The goal for these kinds of trades was simply to move off salary and set things up for free agency or for a new era of Magic basketball.
In that respect, many of these deals accomplished that goal. There is no getting around that.
Still, they all left a bad taste for fans in their mouth.
Nick Anderson
In the summer of 1999, the Orlando Magic decided they had reached the end of the road with the remnants of the 1995 Finals team. They lost in the first round of the lockout-shortened season despite tying for the best record in the league. Anfernee Hardaway was not quite the same player and Nick Anderson carried the team as far as he could.
That ended up not being far. The Magic were set to rebuild and set their sights squarely on free agency in 2000.
The team methodically sold off all the players on their team from the old days to make themselves as bad as possible and clear the cap room to go after what would become Grant Hill and Tracy McGrady.
It was a necessary move. But nothing hurt more than trading the Magic’s original draft pick in Nick Anderson after 10 years. Especially after he had such a surprising breakthrough season in 1999.
In a way though, that was selling high.
The Magic got a decent player in Tariq Abdul-Wahad. He averaged 12.2 points per game in 46 games with the Orlando Magic before he was moved on to the Denver Nuggets for Ron Mercer (and some guy injured guard named Chauncey Billups). Abdul-Wahad shot though just 2 for 21 from deep.
Abdul-Wahad was not a shooter at all. Maybe that was the point.
Ryan Anderson
It is hard to believe Ryan Anderson played just three seasons with the Orlando Magic. He was an incredibly popular and effective player, helping evolve the stretch-4 as someone who changed the game for the Magic. It was Ryan Anderson that made the Magic feel comfortable enough to tinker elsewhere with their lineup (in mostly negative ways, but stay tuned for that).
Anderson shot 38.8 percent on 5.2 3-pointers per game in his three seasons. He was an incredibly effective weapon for the Magic as they tried to push to the NBA Finals in 2010 and tried to keep their championship window open the following two seasons.
When Dwight Howard left though, everything about the Magic changed. They had new management and a new plan to rebuild. That included tearing everything down.
Anderson was a restricted free agent in the summer of 2012. He would normally be a shoo-in for a long extension. But that never came from the Magic. They let him out onto the market and were happy to help him land somewhere he wanted.
Fans did not quite understand why the Magic got so little for Anderson. Gustavo Ayon, an accomplished international player both in FIBA for Mexico and overseas, was OK in the NBA. He spent a lone season with the Magic as a center. There was not much notable about his time.
The purpose of the deal was to help Anderson get where he wanted and to take in as little as possible in return. Still, that left a gaping hole with the Magic’s shooting they struggled to fill.
J.J. Redick
Similar to Ryan Anderson, J.J. Redick was an incredibly popular player who just clicked with the Orlando Magic’s shooting-centric idea for their team around Dwight Howard. Redick seemingly could fit everywhere.
And even in that first year without Howard, Redick made a big impact for the team and still seemed to fit, averaging 15.1 points per gameand shooting 39.0-percent from beyond the arc in that final year.
The Magic knew they were not going to re-sign Redick the next summer just like they knew they were not signing Anderson the previous offseason. So they cashed in.
It is hard to say they did poorly. They took advantage of a Milwaukee Bucks team desperate to make the playoffs and acquired an interesting and underused player in Tobias Harris. It was the perfect kind of deal for a rebuilding team.
The Magic lost shooting — both Doron Lamb and Beno Udrih were solid shooters, but mostly salary filler for this deal — but gained a solid scorer. Harris averaged 17.3 points per game the rest of that season. He averaged 15.6 points per game (on 32.0-percent 3-point shooting) in his four seasons with the Magic.
Orlando never quite found th right fit. But this was certainly a trade that made sense at the time.
Orlando Magic Shooting Month: Shooting trades the Magic regret
Shooting Acquisition Fails
There are undoubtedly some ideas the Orlando Magic had when they went after shooters that looked really good on paper and seemed certain to succeed. But then they turn around and fall flat and hit them on their face.
Not everything works out even if there is some logic to it. These are some of those signings and ideas.
Brian Cook
This is perhaps one of the most reviled trades in Orlando Magic history. But at the time it was made, it did not really raise a blip.
Sure, the Magic were trading away a young, promising defensive player. And the team probably was not in a great position to make those kinds of deals in 2008.
The Magic were cruising and surprising the league to win the Southeast Division eventually. But nothing was assured at that point — neither was their eventual ascendancy to title contention.
What Stan Van Gundy was looking for was reliable shooting and consistency for this new style he was fully embracing. And Trevor Ariza just did not fit the deal. In the 2008 season, he missed all three of his 3-pointers in 11 games that season. Ariza was just not a comfortable 3-point shooter.
The Magic grabbed Brian Cook then to be a backup power forward who could spread the floor like they were doing with Rashard Lewis. Cook shot 39.0-percent from three in the 2008 season for the Magic and 40.0-percent across three seasons for Orlando.
The team got the like-for-like swap in the defensive-minded Maurice Evans in the deal too. Evans made 39.6-percent of his 3-pointers in that 2008 season. The Magic got what they wanted from that position (and eventually replaced him with free agent Mickael Pietrus in the offseason).
That deal made a lot of sense on paper even if Cook did not fully work out — the Magic eventually used him in the trade that brought in Rafer Alston.
Still, the team faced some immediate regret in 2009.
Ariza eventually turned himself into a 3-point shooter. He made 31.9-percent of his threes in the 2009 season as his attempts ticked up. More importantly, he made 47.6-percent of his 3-pointers in the 2009 playoffs including 10 of 24 3-pointers in the NBA Finals series over the Magic.
No trade came back to bite Orlando more than this one. Even if it made complete sense.
Channing Frye
The Orlando Magic were certainly desperate for shooting to help support their young roster in the wake of the Dwight Howard trade. They desperately needed it too because they kept drafting guards who could not shoot at all.
Enter Channing Frye, signed to a four-year, $32-million deal.
He had all the makings of the kind of player that would help the Magic. He could play power forward or center and help stretch the floor. He was a good veteran that had good presence and was well-liked in the locker room.
And, honestly, he produced. Frye made 39.4-percent of his 3-pointers in two seasons with the Magic.
But things just did not work out. It was clear very early on that Channing Frye was not buying into what Jacque Vaughn was trying to preach as head coach.
No one could honestly blame him with how quickly things went off the rails that season and how disastrous the Magic’s front office was under Rob Hennigan (despite good intentions).
There really was not a plan to implement him.
The failure with Frye is a perfect example of how things can look good on paper but just do not click in reality. Frye was a good shooter but the wrong person for this young Magic team. And they were never able to make it work tactically.
Orlando Magic Shooting Month: Shooting trades the Magic regret
Goodbye ROY
The Orlando Magic needed all the help they could get in the Tracy McGrady era.
With Grant Hill’s contract sitting like an albatross around their neck and Hill on the bench struggling to get back onto the court with his ankle and foot injuries, the Magic had to find value wherever they could. If there was a failure in McGrady’s four-year run, it was their inability to play the margins.
And they, frankly, squandered their one success.
Mike Miller was the last piece of the Anfernee Hardaway draft night trade, delivering that final first round pick in the 2000 Draft. And Miller quickly made his mark, winning Rookie of the Year and becoming an ace shooter to pair with McGrady.
Miller averaged 14.1 points per game and shot 38.0-percent from beyond the arc in three seasons with the Magic. He would develop into a better shooter throughout the course of his career. But he was a fantastic shooter in Orlando too.
He averaged 11.9 points per game and shot 40.7-percent from beyond the arc helped the Magic reach the playoffs as a 7-seed in McGrady’s first year in Orlando and helped Miller win Rookie of the Year.
Miller and McGrady were fast and close friends on the team. And their partnership only grew as it became increasingly clear they had to rely on each other (with help from Darrell Armstrong at point guard) as the Magic struggled to put together a solid roster.
It made the move in February 2003 all the more strange.
Miller and McGrady were at a season ticket holder event that night and there was no whiff of a trade. But there it was a few hours later that evening and Miller was shipped off to Memphis and McGrady was clearly peeved — his first game after the trade, he scored 52 points in three quarters in a win over the Chicago Bulls.
On paper, this seemed like a decent idea.
The Magic traded Mike Miller for another shooter in Gordan Giricek. Giricek averaged 11.7 points per game and shot a decent 36.6-percent from beyond the arc. Even with his time in Memphis, he was a clear downgrade from Miller.
The real idea may have been getting Drew Gooden. Gooden was the fourth pick in the previous year’s draft and was considered one of the better rookies that year. He averaged 12.1 points per game with the Grizzlies before the trade.
After the trade, he averaged 13.6 points per game and 8.4 rebounds per game, finally giving the Magic an inside presence they missed throughout the McGrady era. Orlando finished the season 16-11 to solidify their playoff spot, albeit finishing eighth.
Everyone should know what happened in the 2003 Playoffs series with the Detroit Pistons.
It turned out Drew Gooden was not the answer — especially when the team brought in Juwan Howard the following summer as their big free agent and neither player wanted to play center creating a lot of awkward fits.
This was almost certainly a case where then-general manager John Gabriel was overthinking things. This was a trade where the Magic clearly devalued the shooting they had and thought it was replaceable — not to mention risked alienating their star by trading one of his best friends on the team.
This did not clearly make the Magic better, even though they played well after the deal. Everything collapsed on the team the next season as the Magic fell to 21-61, lost their star and had to restart their team (getting the first pick helped with that).
But here was a case where the Magic’s goal was to get some size and post help. They did that but sacrificed shooting to do it. And that may have cost them the most.
Orlando Magic Shooting Month: Shooting trades the Magic regret
More Friend Troubles
The Orlando Magic’s puzzling January trade of Cuttino Mobley to the Sacramento Kings will remain one of the strangest and most criticized deals in Orlando history.
In that first year after trading Tracy McGrady in 2005, the Magic were cruising at 18-14 with Steve Francis playing at an All-Star level and Dwight Howard finding his footing in a reduced role. Grant Hill was healthy and playing well. Hedo Turkoglu was getting his Magic time going.
This was a talented and capable playoff team. Cuttino Mobley was a big part of that. He is still among the best shooters by 3-point percentage in Magic history. Which is incredible considering he played only 23 games in a Magic uniform.
Why it was not more is still baffling.
Mobley averaged 16.0 points per game and shot 46.4-percent from beyond the arc. How is that not a player that is super valuable? How is that not a player who you get more for in return in a trade? Instead the Magic gave up another player to get Doug Christie!
Christie was not a bad shooter. But he was more known for his defense. And it fit the defensive mentality that then-general manager Jon Weisbrod was trying to build. Christie was still one of the best defensive players in the league.
He averaged 7.3 points per game and shot 25.6-percent from beyond the arc. Just go back up a few paragraphs and compare those two stat lines and give a collective, “Huh?”
This was a case of Weisbrod envisioning something for this team and not understanding what makes a good basketball team. Not just on the court, but off-the-court dynamics too.
This deal was a disaster in every way.
Christie was not thrilled about coming to Orlando and bristled with coaching and the general situation. He ended up sitting out the final 26 games with the enduring vision or story of his time being his agent shaking a bag supposedly filled with his bone spurs after questions about whether he was actually injured emerged.
Francis was not thrilled about the Magic suddenly trading his best friend in Mobley.
Francis was on an All-Star path that season, averaging 21.3 points per game and 7.0 assists per game. But after Mobley’s trade, Francis’ temper came to the front. That included a two-game suspension for refusing to enter a game and kicking a cameraman in Seattle.
The Magic’s season collapsed and they missed the playoffs.
This is a trade that never should have happened and had little justification.
Orlando Magic Shooting Month: Shooting trades the Magic regret
The Day the Title Window Closed
Dec. 18, 2010 is a day that should live in infamy for the Orlando Magic. It was the day the Orlando Magic’s late-2000s title window completely closed. The day the team was no longer a title contender.
This was not quite the beginning of the end for Dwight Howard. There was a brief reprieve when the Magic won a franchise-record nine straight games in the wake of these two deals.
But everyone knew everything was different and the Magic were not grasping for straws to stay relevant. A first-round playoff loss and a looming lockout put the team on the path toward a Dwight-mare.
In two trades and one fell swoop, the Magic completely shifted their roster (they barely had enough players to play their game that evening against the Philadelphia 76ers — and still lost only 97-89).
The Magic traded away one of their best shooting role players and the guy who was supposed to be their best perimeter scorer along with their backup center for shooting, a nostalgia play and a prospect. They then swapped injured and aging stars for each other, hoping to recapture some magic from Gilbert Arenas.
Orlando got plenty of shooting in this deal.
Richardson was not the same high flyer he was with the Golden State Warriors and reformed himself into a great 3-point shooter. He had one of the great flamethrower games in the 2012 season when he made nine 3-pointers to lead the Magic to a shocking win.
Arenas still showed some flashes of his superstardom although it was clear that was well behind him. He had the “I can’t feel my face” game when he made three 3-pointers in the second half to help guide the Orlando Magic to a come-from-behind win over the Miami Heat in the first year of the LeBron James-Dwyane Wade-Chris Bosh trio.
There were things that worked. But hardly consistent enough.
This ended up moving deckchairs on the Titanic.
Yes, the deal freed up time for Ryan Anderson to emerge as the Most Improved Player in the 2011 season. That is why the Magic were comfortable trading Lewis. That may have been a risk worth taking — especially with the team knowing an amnesty was likely coming to get them out from Arenas’ deal if it did not work.
But Orlando essentially chased shooting without concern for fit on the court, where players were developmentally or even how their coach Stan Van Gundy would use them. Arenas famously clashed with Van Gundy and the pieces just did not match.
The Magic’s big failure that year was not finding the right deal to keep their championship window open. Instead, they shut it closed and began walking the path toward trading their Hall of Fame superstar once again.